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iEstimates show that fossil fuel subsidies average USD 400–600 billion annually worldwide while renewable energy (RE) subsidies 
amounted to USD 66 billion in 2010 and are predicted to rise to USD 250 billion annually by 2035. Domestic political rationales 
for energy subsidies include promoting innovation, job creation and economic growth, energy security, and independence. Energy 
subsidies may also serve social and environmental goals. Whether and to what extent subsidies are effective to achieve these goals or 
instead lead to market distortions is a matter of much debate and the trade effects of energy subsidies are complex. 
This paper offers an overview of the types of energy subsidies that are used in the conventional and renewable energy sectors, and their 
relationship with climate change, in particular greenhouse gas emissions. While the WTO’s Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing 
Measures (ASCM) is mostly concerned with harm to competitors, this paper considers the extent to which the Agreement could also 
discipline subsidies that cause harm to the environment as a global common.  Beyond the existing legal framework, this paper surveys 
a number of alternatives for improving the ability of subsidies disciplines to internalize climate change costs of energy production and 
consumption. One option is a new multilateral agreement on subsidies or trade remedies (with an appropriate carve-out in the WTO 
regime to allow for it if such an agreement is concluded outside it). Alternatively, climate change-related subsidies could be included 
as part of another multilateral regime or as part of regional agreements. A third approach would be to incorporate rules on energy 
subsidies in sectorial agreements, including a Sustainable Energy Trade Agreement such as has been proposed in other ICTSD studies. 
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1INTRODUCTION
The ICTSD has commissioned a number of valuable reports on clean energy 
subsidies, including ICTSD (2013); Kuntze and Moerenhout (2013); Howse 
(2013); Ghosh with Gangania  (2012); Wilke  (2011). 
In September 2009, G20 leaders gathered in Pittsburgh and committed 
to “rationalize and phase out over the medium term inefﬁcient fossil 
fuel subsidies that encourage wasteful consumption” to avoid market 
distortions and barriers to investment in clean energy sources which would 
undermine efforts to deal with climate change (G20 Leaders’ Statement 
2009).
1
2
Estimates show that fossil fuel subsidies average USD 400–
600 billion annually worldwide while renewable energy 
(RE) subsidies amounted to USD 66 billion in 2010 and are 
predicted to rise to USD 250 billion annually by 2035 (IEA 
2011a). Domestic political rationales for energy subsidies 
include promoting innovation, job creation and economic 
growth, energy security, and independence.1 They may 
also serve social and environmental goals. Whether and to 
what extent subsidies are effective to achieve these goals 
or instead lead to market distortions is a matter of much 
debate, and no comprehensive economic analyses appear 
to have been conducted on this to date (Morris 2012). A 
related issue is how such subsidies compare with alternative 
regulatory instruments aimed at the same objectives, 
such as command and control regulation (for example, RE 
mandates) and taxation (for example, carbon taxes, border 
adjustment measures). 
The trade effect of energy subsidies provides another 
layer of complexity. While fossil fuels and ﬁssile materials 
for nuclear fuel are traded regionally and globally, RE 
tends to be produced locally since electricity storage and 
transportation technologies are still underdeveloped. For 
instance, wind and solar energy tends to be consumed 
domestically or across contiguous states, rather than 
shipped across continents or oceans. The production inputs 
(photovoltaic cells, wind turbines, and so on), however, 
tend to be traded, as do biofuels. The ﬁnancing of RE 
infrastructure may be done through foreign investment, 
with its corollary trade impacts. Subsidies with trade 
impacts and trade remedies affecting RE, then, involve 
the goods used to create the production facilities, and 
the conditions for foreign investment. Subsidies to the 
consumption of RE can also affect trade if imported 
conventional energy resources become less favoured 
(substitution effect).
The remainder of this paper proceeds in three parts.
1.  Conceptualizing energy subsidies and market distortion 
for a climate change perspective.
2. Evaluating governmental interventions in the energy 
sector.
3.  Ways forward.
Two-thirds of global greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions 
are currently generated by the energy sector (IEA 2013: 
15). The main source of energy-related GHG emissions 
is fossil fuels, which still account for over 80 percent of 
global energy consumption (IEA 2013: 15). When looking 
at energy subsidies from a climate change perspective, 
the main category of market-distorting subsidies are fossil 
fuel subsidies. In 2012, worldwide fossil fuel consumption 
subsidies amounted to USD 544 billion, corresponding to an 
incentive of USD 110/tonne of CO2 (IEA 2013: 93). Fossil fuel 
production subsidies account for USD 100 billion per year 
(GSI 2012). The International Energy Agency (IEA) estimates 
that if fossil fuel subsidies are fully eliminated by 2020, 
global primary energy demand will decrease by 5 percent and 
CO2 emissions by 5.8 percent (2013: 507).2
All or nearly all fossil fuel subsidies generate environmental 
externalities if it stimulates excessive production and 
consumption of fossil fuels. In this sense, fossil fuels subsidies 
always incorporate a market-distortive element inasmuch as 
they cause harm to global commons. The externalization of 
emissions resulting from energy production and usage can be 
seen as a market failure when governments do not require 
producers to internalize the environmental cost from their 
emissions. 
Rather than devising subsidies and other market correcting 
measures to roll back on this cost externalization, we could 
envision an energy-neutral, market-focused system to 
compute the environmental costs of energy into the price of 
goods and services. Climate change economists, in particular, 
have made great strides in developing methodologies to 
CONCEPTUALIZING 
ENERGY SUBSIDIES AND 
MARKET DISTORTION 
FOR A CLIMATE CHANGE 
PERSPECTIVE
2as member states’ choice to omit certain topics from their 
trade negotiations (for example, labour standards), already 
point to a balancing exercise between decreasing barriers to 
trade and allowing trade restrictions for particular objectives. 
Unfortunately, subsidies to conventional energy and RE do 
not fall neatly into one or the other of the two categories 
outlined above. While only a limited set of energy subsidies 
directly alters the observable price for the supported fuels to 
the beneﬁt of selected industrial sectors, fossil fuel subsidies 
stimulating their excessive production or consumption have 
an adverse impact on the environment as they discourage 
energy-efﬁciency improvements, increase GHG emissions, 
and create barriers to clean energy investments.4
Insofar as fossil fuel consumption subsidies keep domestic 
prices of conventional energy inputs artiﬁcially low to 
the advantage of key industrial sectors, they may hinder 
competition to the detriment of international competitors. 
The same holds true for fossil fuel production subsidies that 
lower the cost of energy production. The treatment of fossil 
fuel subsidies under the ASCM may vary depending on the 
channels through which they are administered (that is, 
the way in which a transfer is created) and on their formal 
incidence (that is, to whom and what a transfer is conferred). 
The market-distorting effects of fossil fuel subsidies may 
operate at various levels, either by altering the price at which 
conventional energy inputs are consumed domestically and/
or traded internationally or by distorting the price of energy-
intensive products sold in the international market. While 
fossil fuel subsidies always contribute to externalising the 
environmental costs of polluting forms of energy, in some 
cases they also serve as a social safety net (for example, 
subsidised kerosene rations in India to ensure basic access to 
energy for cooking and transportation). 
Conversely, subsidies that put RE on an equal footing 
with heavily subsidized fossil fuels could be thought of 
as correcting a market distortion. However, this subsidy 
escalation between clean energy and fossil fuels entails 
additional market distortions and environmental costs from 
overproduction.
more accurately compute the full costs of emissions, in 
particular carbon.3 Some models take into account not only 
the future environmental cost of emissions, but also the 
harm to human health from particulate matter, air pollution, 
and other harms (Committee on Health, Environmental, 
and Other External Costs and Beneﬁts of Energy Production 
and Consumption and National Research Council 2010). 
Moreover, a number of states and domestic jurisdictions 
already have emissions certiﬁcates and emissions trading 
mechanisms that rely on such accounting.
Emissions externalization could then be deﬁned as an 
implicit subsidy to energy producers, consumers, and 
downstream goods. Undoubtedly, there is a beneﬁt to 
producers from emissions externalization. However, 
characterizing government inaction (the failure to require 
cost internalization) as a subsidy is problematic, and no 
political consensus exists on emissions internalization 
schemes globally. In World Trade Organization (WTO) terms, 
it would also be impossible to deﬁne such an economy-
wide implicit subsidy as “speciﬁc.” Therefore, although 
emissions externalization has, in many ways, effects similar 
to a subsidy, it will not be considered here as a subsidy in 
the generally accepted sense of the term. For governments 
that do require emissions accounting and regulate emissions 
permits, internalization of emissions from production abroad 
could be handled with border adjustment measures, rather 
than through subsidies or trade remedies.
The relationship between energy subsidies and climate 
change may be evaluated along several axes.
•	 Is	the	subsidy	seeking	to	address	a	market	distortion?	
•	 Is	the	subsidy	creating	a	distortion?
As to the ﬁrst question, if a subsidy is meant to address a 
market distortion, we might ask whether that is the best way 
to remedy the distortion, or whether other trade instruments 
might be better tailored to the task, from a legal or practical 
perspective. Other policy instruments might include trade 
remedies, industrial policy, or regulatory instruments (such 
as certiﬁcates, emissions limitations, renewable energy 
quotas). 
As to the second question, if a subsidy is causing a market 
distortion, we might ask whether the measure should be 
eliminated, countervailed, or safe-harboured. While the 
WTO Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures 
(ASCM) already provides a framework for answering such 
questions, the issue is whether the imperatives of adaptation 
to climate change and its mitigation require different criteria 
than those currently in place. The fundamental issue here is 
whether some subsidies might be desirable in spite of their 
market-distorting effect, recognizing that the liberalization 
objective of trade regimes does not operate in a social 
vacuum and will at times yield to other policy priorities, such 
as the protection of global commons. The general exceptions 
in the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and 
General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS), as well 
See, for example, Ecofys (2014); Newbold et al.  (2013); Borentstein (2011); 
Greenstone et al. (2011);  Olson et al. (2012).
The adverse impact on the environment linked to these measures is often 
counterbalanced, at least declaratorily, by political, social, and economic 
goals. Recent studies, however, show that fossil fuel subsidies have seldom 
achieved their stated goals (IEA 2013: 507). 
Depending on the form of energy that is subsidized, the effects on 
international competition may vary according to whether the energy input 
at issue is traded internationally (for example, in the case of oil resources) 
or rather more at a local/regional level (for example, electricity/natural gas). 
The effect of consumption subsidies on natural gas to support the fertilizers 
industry is an illustration.  
3
4
5
3Understood more broadly, market-correcting subsidies 
could also cover any subsidy designed to help producers 
and consumers internalize the environmental cost of energy 
production, transmission, distribution, and consumption. 
At the same time, RE production and distribution have an 
environmental cost and a climate impact. To the extent that 
this cost is externalized, RE subsidies also create a market 
distortion. 
The following section reviews some of the main government 
interventions in the energy sector; it assesses whether they 
would be considered as a subsidy and what their impact 
might be in terms of market distortion.
Table 1 provides a limited overview of the main subsidies 
in the energy sector observed globally, with some national 
or regional illustrations. The purpose of this paper is not 
to provide an extensive catalog. The Organisation for 
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) and 
the International Energy Agency (IEA), in particular, have 
developed extensive resources on monetary support and tax 
expenditures for fossil fuels.6 
SUBSIDIES
The energy sector traditionally represents a major area 
of government intervention. Governments widely resort 
to subsidies directed to various types of energy (fossil 
fuels, nuclear power, RE such as solar or wind electricity, 
and biofuels). On a general level, these government 
practices either lower the price paid by energy consumers 
(consumption subsidies), lower the cost of energy 
production, or raise the price received by energy producers 
(production subsidies) (IEA 2011b). The most typical subsidies 
include 
•	 Tax	 expenditures	 (mainly	 excise	 tax	 reduction	 or	
exemption on fuel to the beneﬁt of particular industrial 
users or sectors, but also carbon taxes, and more 
generally eco-tax concessions);
•	 Dual	 pricing	 policies	 (price	 controls	 or	 ceilings,	 sales	 of	
energy inputs by state trading enterprises at preferential 
rates), as well as export taxes or other types of export 
restrictions;
•	 Favourable	 credit	 terms	 (concessional	 loans	 and	 loan	
guarantees); and
•	 Research	and	development	(R&D)	grants	by	governments	
to support fundamental and applied research. 
Their scope is considerably broader than the legal deﬁnition 
of “subsidy” adopted under the ASCM. It is therefore 
important to assess whether the existing ASCM disciplines 
capture market-distorting energy subsidies while still 
providing sufﬁcient ﬂexibilities for market-correcting energy 
subsidies. 
Fossil Fuel Subsidies 
Tax expenditures typically fall within the deﬁnition of 
subsidies under the ASCM as “tax revenue foregone” and 
conferring a “beneﬁt” measurable in terms of the gap 
between the price of a certain fuel for industrial consumers 
that has been granted a tax concession and the reference 
price borne by other users. Tax reductions or exemptions are 
usually granted to a speciﬁc group of industries (for instance, 
energy-intensive industries such as iron and steel) or to a 
speciﬁc sector (such as electricity generation), especially in 
energy-importing OECD countries. However, preferential 
tax treatments are at times granted to the general beneﬁt 
of the domestic manufacturing sector (for example, in 
Italy, excise tax reductions beneﬁt all large industrial users 
of natural gas), and may therefore not to be subject to 
ASCM disciplines. Finally, certain EU countries confer tax 
concessions to encourage the use of less polluting fuels such 
as natural gas and liqueﬁed petroleum gas (LPG). These 
support measures are often not speciﬁc (policies in France 
and Italy are examples), but they are sometimes conﬁned to 
a set of beneﬁciaries (for example, in the case of Germany) 
and would then be subject to ASCM disciplines. 
On the consumption side, many developed and developing 
countries adopt tax expenditures (such as reduced value-
added tax [VAT] or excise tax on fuel) or direct budgetary 
transfers (including fuel vouchers or heating energy grants) 
directed to speciﬁc users, such as low-income households, or 
sectors (including agriculture, ﬁshery, public transportation). 
These measures are widely applied to advance social goals 
and achieve re-distributional effects.7 They fall within the 
deﬁnition of subsidy and are speciﬁc in most cases. The 
chances they will be challenged are, however, quite low. 
On the production side, governments intervene in the 
markets through a number of direct expenditures (direct 
GOVERNMENT 
INTERVENTION IN  
THE ENERGY SECTOR
See “OECD-IEA Fossil Fuel Subsidies and Other Support” database, 
http://www.oecd.org/site/tadffss/. 
The IEA estimates that fossil fuel consumption subsidies are an 
inefﬁcient means to alleviate poverty as they are only marginally 
distributed to the poorest segments of the population while often 
placing unsustainable burdens on state budgets, especially in the case 
of high energy prices (IEA, OECD, World Bank 2009: 11–13).  
6
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4Type of subsidy Main purpose Examples
Conventional energy Clean energy
Tax 
expenditures
(tax credits, 
deductions, 
deferrals, 
exclusions, 
accelerated 
depreciation or 
preferential tax 
rates)
Production 
support
Canada, UK, US: accelerated capital cost 
allowance; income tax deductions for oil and gas 
corporations;
Australia, Canada, UK: tax deductions for 
exploration and/or extraction costs; capital 
expenditure deductions
Germany, US: mining royalty reduction for coal;
US: income tax credits for coke and coke gas; 
intangible drilling costs deduction; excess of 
percentage over cost depletion
US: tax incentives on underlying property 
if used for renewable energy production, 
tax breaks for commercial and residential 
conservation upgrades
EU countries, US: reduced taxes on biofuels 
India, US: investment tax credits to attract 
investors to RE sector
Consumption 
support
EU countries: excise tax and/or CO2 tax 
exemptions on fuels for energy-intensive 
industries (e.g. steel) or industries engaged 
in energy upgrading/transformation (e.g. 
electricity)
Direct 
expenditures
Production 
support and 
conservation
Estonia: direct project grants to producers of 
shale derived oil
Korea: coal mining production support and 
support to briquette production
US: rebates for commercial and residential 
energy conservation upgrades, creation of 
green manufacturing centres
EU, US: agricultural subsidies supporting 
the production and export of biofuel or 
biofuel feedstock
India, China: government land acquisition/
land transfer below market price to 
subsidize solar and wind power installations
Consumption 
support
India, China: fuel vouchers, heating-energy 
grants
Government 
policies raising/
lowering 
domestic prices
Production 
support
Slovak Republic: feed-in tariff for domestic 
lignite
Chile, Korea: import tariffs on hydrocarbons 
EU countries, Canada: preferential, 
long term guaranteed feed-in-tariffs for 
electricity production from wind and solar 
power
Consumption 
support
Russia, Middle East countries: dual pricing on 
natural gas 
 Indonesia, Russian Federation, China, Argentina, 
Colombia: export restrictions on hydrocarbons 
Some EU countries: FIT to individual 
producer/consumers
Loan and loan 
guarantees
Project 
development, 
R&D scaling
US: federal loan guarantees for investment in 
clean coal
US: federal loan guarantees for new investor-
owned nuclear reactors
US: support production of components 
(batteries, solar panels), to scale up R&D
China: support to production of solar and 
wind components
Research and 
development
Improve 
technology for 
production, 
storage and 
conservation
Japan: develop oil reﬁning technology 
programmes
Korea, New Zealand: improve oil & gas 
exploration technologies
US: funding for projects in fossil energy (e.g. coal 
liquefaction)
New Zealand, Norway: acquire petroleum 
exploration data 
UK: low carbon technology research 
support to help meet Kyoto commitments
Australia, Czech Rep., US: improve 
efﬁciency of clean energy production, new 
clean energy technology 
US: improve energy saving in household 
appliances
Recent Illustrative Energy Subsidies
TABLE 1:
5grants linked to capital or to the acquisition of land); tax 
expenditures (accelerated capital cost allowances;, income 
tax deductions, investment tax credits, reduced royalties or 
extraction taxes); concessional loans; and loans guarantees 
aimed at reducing the cost of coal as well as oil and gas 
production. These measures create market distortions in that 
they encourage higher levels of production by less efﬁcient 
and more polluting producers. Many European countries, for 
instance, still support hard coal mining and/or the use of 
domestic coal for speciﬁc uses such as heating (in Finland by 
means of energy tax concessions) or electricity generation (in 
Slovenia, Spain, and Slovak Republic through market-support 
mechanisms).8
Finally, fossil fuels production is also subsidized by means of 
R&D grants given by governments to support the acquisition 
of exploration data or exploration technologies for oil and 
natural gas. 
The most common types of fossil fuel production subsidies 
typically fall within the ASCM deﬁnition of a subsidy and are 
in principle countervailable if they are designed to pass the 
speciﬁcity test. However, their adverse effect may be hard to 
prove in the following scenarios. 
•	 when	subsidies	are	not	specific;
•	 when	support	measures	protect	local	production	that	has	
no trade impact as a means to simply maintain regional 
employment in depressed areas and/or in periods of 
economic crisis or transition (for example, small local 
mines);
•	 when	 subsidies	 are	 meant	 to	 help	 highly	 inefficient	
domestic energy production competing with imports; and
•	 in	the	case	of	large	energy	producers	when	the	subsidised	
production is so vast as to depress international market 
prices;
•	 when	 subsidies	 have	 no	 trade	 effect	 but	 cause	 GHG	
emissions.
Renewable Energy Subsidies
A number of tax expenditures, direct expenditures, R&D 
grants, and favourable credit terms promote the production 
and consumption of clean energy as a substitute for 
conventional fuels. Most of them seem to fall within the 
ASCM deﬁnition of “subsidy.” In many cases, however, it is 
unclear whether they would pass the speciﬁcity test. 
A number of these subsidies could be countervailable if they 
were speciﬁc to an industry. Subsidies to support biofuel 
production, in particular, may be at issue. Some of these 
subsidies are also contingent on local content and have been 
challenged at the WTO on that basis.9
As with subsidies on conventional fuels, RE subsidies include 
an array of tax expenditures, R&D funding, preferential loans, 
and loan guarantees.
Tax expenditures used to spur innovation in energy 
sources, storage, transmission, and conservation fall more 
squarely within the traditional deﬁnition of a subsidy. Such 
interventions help to overcome barriers to entry to a market 
where existing players externalize their environmental costs 
and where new entrants will be internalizing more of their 
costs. They typically take the form of tax credits, deferments, 
deductions or exclusions, accelerated depreciation, and direct 
expenditures to upgrade infrastructure to improve energy 
conservation (residential and commercial).
Tax expenditures and direct expenditures to promote energy 
conservation also typically fall within the deﬁnition of a 
subsidy. Most are available to any commercial enterprise 
wishing to upgrade its facilities, and therefore are not speciﬁc 
and not subject to ASCM disciplines. A signiﬁcant portion 
of these expenditures are available to residential users, who 
would likely not even qualify as an “industry” or “enterprise.” 
State aid for residential users is often considered to have a 
social purpose as well, helping low- and middle-income 
households to reduce their energy bills.
R&D grants to support fundamental and applied research on 
RE production, storage, and distribution will fall within the 
covered subsides of the ASCM if they are speciﬁc in the sense 
of Article 2. For instance, a grant for the development of 
hydrogen fuel cells might not be considered speciﬁc as there 
may not be a deﬁnable industry that is the beneﬁciary, and 
recipients might be indeterminate enough that the subsidy 
could not be said to be conﬁned to a group of enterprises 
or industries. In contrast, R&D subsidies to improve the 
efﬁciency of photovoltaic panels may well be aimed only at 
solar panel companies, such that it might be speciﬁc to an 
industry. While R&D grants have little chance of being export 
contingent, they would run counter to Article 3 if they are 
conditioned upon the use of domestic goods input. ASCM 
Article 8.2(a) might have exempted R&D grants but this 
provision expired in 2000, before most of the R&D subsidies 
for RE were awarded. 
Loans at preferential credit terms and loan guarantees 
to scale R&D on RE from lab to market to infrastructure 
In certain countries, however, coal subsidies are part of a more 
comprehensive policy aimed at rationalising and progressively 
downsizing uneconomic mining production and remedying past 
environmental damages (for example, Germany, Hungary, Poland, 
Slovak Republic) (OECD 2012).  
Appellate Body Report, Canada–Measures Affecting the Renewable 
Energy Generation Sector, WT/DS412/AB/R, and Canada—Measures 
Relating to the Feed-in Tariff Program, WT/DS426/AB/R, 6 May 2013. 
Ongoing cases include EU–Measures Concerning the Importation of 
Biodiesel, WT/DS459; India–Solar Cells and Solar Modules WT/DS456; 
EU–Certain Measures Relating to the Energy Sector WT/DS452; and 
China–Measures Concerning Wind Power Equipment, WT/DS419.
8
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6(including commercial and residential buildings), improve 
energy conservation, and manufacture components used 
to produce clean energy (such as solar panels, batteries, 
wind turbines) will typically fall within the ASCM deﬁnition 
of a subsidy. As with R&D subsidies, whether they will 
be prohibited or countervailable will depend on their 
speciﬁcity and whether they are contingent on export or 
domestic content. Loans and loan guarantees to support the 
manufacture of clean energy components (for instance, solar 
panel manufacture by Sunpower and Solyndra in the US, 
battery manufacture by Tesla) are more likely to be speciﬁc 
and therefore countervailable.
Credit facilities available to upgrade infrastructure to meet 
emissions reduction requirements would likely have been 
exempted under the expired Article 8.2(c) (assistance to 
promote adaptation of existing facilities to new environmental 
requirements) under certain conditions. However, they can still 
be designed in non-speciﬁc terms, such that they would not be 
disciplined by the ASCM. These are used widely in Europe and 
the US (federal and state levels).
Measures designed to ensure that energy prices do not 
fall below a level that allows for the internalization of 
environmental costs or guaranteed purchase price for energy 
produced using renewable sources might be a form of 
income or price support within the meaning of ASCM Article 
1.1(a)(2). In Canada–Renewable Energy/FIT, Japan argued 
that Canada’s feed-in tariff (FIT) amounted to income or 
price support, but the panel declined to decide the issue and 
the Appellate Body (AB) agreed that such a ﬁnding was not 
necessary for the disposition of the case.10 The only point of 
reference for interpreting “income or price support” is Note 
2 Ad Article XVI, paragraph 3, included in Annex I of the 
GATT 1947. Basically, government measures that stabilize 
the domestic price or the return to domestic producers of 
a product so that export prices are sometimes lower than 
domestic prices would not be considered an export subsidy 
if export prices are also comparable to or higher than in the 
domestic market during the representative period, and if 
the price or income support is not designed “to stimulate 
exports or otherwise seriously prejudice the interests of 
other contracting parties.” In particular, a FIT arguably 
guarantees income to the energy producer and might result 
in an electricity price higher than the export price. But if 
there are also electricity exports at a price similar or higher 
than the FIT during the period, and the FIT was not designed 
to boost exports and seriously prejudice other members, it 
would not be considered a subsidy. Some issues considered 
in Canada–FIT, such as whether there is a separate market 
for energy from renewable sources, would likely bear on 
such an analysis. Additionally, there may not be exports of 
comparable energy products, and if there are, prices tend to 
ﬂuctuate quite signiﬁcantly (particularly for electricity). So 
the factual premises for making an income or price support 
case might be very hard to meet. Last, GATT Article XVI, 
paragraph 3, deals with “primary products.” It is unclear 
whether biofuels (which involve signiﬁcant processing) or 
electricity would qualify.
Nuclear Subsidies
Finally, to the extent that the support measures directed to 
the nuclear sector make nuclear power available to industrial 
users at a much lower price than the prevalent price for fossil 
fuel-ﬁred power generation, the argument might be made 
that they hamper competition and should therefore be 
subject under ASCM disciplines. The nuclear sector beneﬁts 
from a wide array of production subsidies that typically fall 
within the ASCM deﬁnition of a subsidy—direct expenditures 
(including capital grants mainly linked to capital, accelerated 
depreciation), tax expenditures (such as investment tax 
credits, special depletion allowances and reduced royalty for 
uranium mining, underpricing of cooling water), and loan 
guarantees (for new plants and enrichment facilities) (Koplow 
2011). Regulatory liability limits for accidents also arguably 
constitutes a subsidy to the nuclear power industry (EIA 
1992: 77-78).
EXPORT MEASURES
Dual pricing practices are widely implemented by energy-
endowed countries as a means of reserving cheaper energy 
inputs and/or electricity for domestic consumers, including 
industrial users. The ASCM does not speciﬁcally tackle 
“market transfers” and thus its disciplines may not prove 
sufﬁcient, depending on how dual pricing practices are 
implemented. The main problem related to “classical” forms 
of dual pricing is that, even in a scenario where they are 
considered to fall within the deﬁnition of “subsidy,”11 such 
practices are often equally applied to all manufacturing 
sectors and are therefore not “speciﬁc” within the meaning 
of Article 2.12 The issue of dual pricing has also been inserted 
in the Doha Round rules negotiations. In this context, the US 
and the EU have both proposed expanding the category of 
prohibited subsidies under Article 3 of the ASCM.13 According 
to the EU proposal, in particular, Article 3.1 should also 
cover “the provision, by the virtue of government action, of 
goods to domestic production on terms and conditions more 
favourable than those generally available for such goods 
“Canada–Renewable Energy” and “Canada–Feed-in Tariff,” WT/DS412/
AB/R, WT/DS426/AB/R, paras. 5.133–5.139.
Several authors have considered that dual pricing schemes possibly fall 
within the deﬁnition of subsidy under Article 1.1 (a) (iii) and (iv) ASCM 
at least when government-set prices do not provide for an “adequate 
remuneration” (full recovery of costs and a reasonable proﬁt) as 
required by Article 14 (d) ASCM (Pogoretskyy 2012: 181–228). 
It is uncertain whether dual pricing could be considered to be de facto 
speciﬁc (Selivanova 2004: 574–79). 
“Expanding the Prohibited ‘Red Light’ Subsidy Category, United States 
Proposal,” WTO/RL/GEN/94, 16 January 2006; Submission of the 
European Communities on Subsidies, European Union Proposal, WTO/
TN/RL/GEN/135, 24 April 2006.
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7when destined for export.”14 The proposal has, however, 
not gained general consensus among WTO Members. 
Country-speciﬁc WTO-plus obligations on dual pricing were 
negotiated within the context of the accession of Saudi 
Arabia and the Russian Federation.15 These commitments are, 
however, narrowly tailored and only concern natural gas and 
certain related items. Dual pricing is also being addressed in 
the accession packages of the numerous energy-producing 
countries currently negotiating their accession to the WTO. 
Price differentials between domestic and international prices 
of fossil fuels may also be induced through the use of trade 
measures such as export taxes and restrictions. The status 
of export restraints under the ASCM is unclear. Proving the 
existence of a “ﬁnancial contribution” is difﬁcult because the 
government obviously does not provide itself the cheaper 
input material. If the effect of the export restriction is that 
the government entices private operators to provide energy 
inputs to domestic users, as opposed to foreign buyers, at 
a price that is below market prices, the argument might 
be made that the government’s encouragement is a form 
of “entrustment” or “direction” under Article 1.1.(a)(1)
(iv). However, in US – DRAMS the AB explained that the 
government must be in a position to control the private 
suppliers and to command them to sell the input material 
to domestic users.16 In Canada – Export Restraints, the 
“entrusts or directs” standard was further interpreted to 
require an “explicit and afﬁrmative action, be it delegation 
or command.”17 This may be possible if the export restraint 
is associated with sales by domestic state trading enterprises, 
under government control and at its direction, of the product 
subject to the restriction. The existence of a “beneﬁt” 
under Article 1.1(b) might also be difﬁcult as in the case 
of export restrictions the domestic market is distorted 
by a government intervention. Depending on the criteria 
used to determine the relevant product market (local or 
international) and the price benchmark (domestic price 
before the export control measure was implemented or 
at the time of purchase of domestic inputs by downstream 
producers, or export/world price), export restrictions may not 
be subject to ASCM disciplines. Quantitative forms of export 
restrictions are nevertheless prohibited by Article XI:1 GATT. 
Export taxes, in contrast, are admissible under the GATT and, 
among net exporters of fossil fuels, the Russian Federation 
is the only WTO Member having undertaken WTO-plus 
obligations on the use of export taxes on fossil fuels. 
REGULATORY MEASURES
Other market-correction measures include carbon taxes; 
cap and/or emissions trading schemes; prohibition on 
consumables and devices that consume too much energy 
(for example, phasing out 100 Watts incandescent light 
bulbs); and RE production or consumption mandates. Such 
regulatory interventions also impact the market but without 
any public budgetary outlay or foregone revenue. Therefore, 
it is unlikely that such government interventions would fall 
within the ASCM deﬁnition of a subsidy as they are not a 
ﬁnancial contribution (on carbon taxes, see Hillman 2013). 
USE OF TRADE REMEDIES IN THE ENERGY 
SECTOR AND WTO DISPUTES 
From 2010 to 2014, 45 members have notiﬁed countervailing 
duties actions to the WTO on energy products or inputs, 
relating both to fossil fuels and RE. From 2012 to 2014, 87 
members have notiﬁed antidumping measures on energy 
products or inputs. No relevant safeguards notiﬁcations 
have been found. Further research on individual countries 
would reveal unreported and under-reported measures, but 
the main trends will likely remain true. The charts below 
show that the EU, the US, and China are the main players 
with respect to trade remedies. There does not appear to 
be a signiﬁcant difference between trade remedy patterns 
observed in the energy sector and the use of trade remedies 
more generally, except that no safeguard measure has been 
notiﬁed in the energy sector.
Figures 5 and 6 compare the number of trade remedies 
imposed on RE compared to conventional energy. The WTO 
notiﬁcations did not include data on the comparative value 
of these measures, or the proportion of trade affected 
for RE and conventional energy products. Anecdotally, 
trade remedies on clean energy in Europe represent a huge 
proportion of the import value affected by trade remedies 
(Katseng 2013). In the US, that trend would be balanced 
against trade remedies on steel (a large source of GHG 
emissions). 
“Expanding the Prohibited ‘Red Light’ Subsidy Category, United States 
Proposal,” WTO/RL/GEN/94, 16 January 2006; Submission of the 
European Communities on Subsidies, European Union Proposal, WTO/
TN/RL/GEN/135, 24 April 2006.
“Report of the Working Party on the Accession of Saudi Arabia,” WT/
ACC/SAU/61, 1 Nov 2005, paras. 33–37; and “Report of the Working 
Party on the Accession of the Russian Federation,” WT/ACC/RUS/70, 17 
Nov 2011, paras. 120–132. 
“Appellate Body Report, United States — Countervailing Duty 
Investigation on Dynamic Random Access Memory Semiconductors 
(DRAMS) from Korea,” WT/DS296/AB/R, adopted 27 June 2005, paras. 
141–198. 
“Panel Report, US – Measures Treating Export Restrictions as Subsidies,” 
WT/DS/194/R, adopted 23 Aug 2001, para. 8.29. 
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8Figure 1:
Countervailing Duties by Reporting Member, 2010-
2014 (45 notiﬁcations)
Figure 2:
Countervailing Duties by Exporting Country, 2010-
2014 (60 countries) 
Figure 3:
Reporting Member of Anti-dumping Measures, 
2010-2014 (N=87)
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9Figure 4:
Exporting Member Target of Anti-dumping 
Measures, 2010-2014 (N=163)
Figure 5:
Products Subject to Countervailing Measures, RE vs. 
Traditional Energy Products (N=45)
Figure 6:
Products Subject to Anti-dumping Measures, RE vs. 
Traditional Energy (N=66)
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Countervailing duties that do not account for the “invisible” 
subsidy of environmental cost externalisation run counter 
to the objective of pursuing an emissions reduction agenda 
in the energy sector. The ASCM or domestic calculating 
methodologies would need to be modiﬁed to reﬂect such 
a cost in the value of the beneﬁt and in the assessment of 
the injury to the domestic industry. So long as the same 
environmental costs are taken into account on both sides of 
the equation, calculations adjusted for environmental costs 
might pass muster under the ASCM. 
Antidumping measures, whether on RE product inputs 
(such as solar panels and wind turbine components) or on 
conventional energy input goods, do not appear to raise any 
particular issue that is unique to the energy sector. 
A growing number of disputes involved energy in recent 
years, particularly RE, most of which focus on ASCM and 
Trade-Related Investment Measures (TRIMS) Agreement 
disciplines. This is not surprising given the dramatic rise in 
state support for RE since 2010. However, most of these 
cases have not yet proceeded to the panel stage or have 
been settled, therefore giving us limited insights into 
how clean energy issues might be addressed. With many 
interpretative questions still open and a number of disputes 
in the process of resolution, some have argued that the very 
uncertainty of how clean energy support measures might 
be treated under the ASCM is a constraint on policy space 
(Rubini 2012). This is effectively a disincentive to move 
towards market-correcting subsidies in the RE space.
The most litigious issue is domestic content requirements, 
triggering disciplines under the GATT (national treatment 
issues), the TRIMS Agreement, and the ASCM. The 
environmental value of local content requirements 
is questionable (Stephenson 2013). Rather, the main 
value of local content requirements lies in employment 
support, industrial development, and energy security and 
independence to some extent. Most of these objectives are 
traditionally seen as market distortions.
Canada–FIT suggests that the panel and the AB are inclined 
to give some consideration to the environmental value of 
RE in their deﬁnition of the benchmark market, which would 
be critical to interpreting the ASCM for a green objective. 
However, the panel and AB’s reasoning in this case have been 
heavily criticised on several grounds (Cosbey and Mavroidis 
2014). Because the RE electricity market provided a higher 
benchmark price in this case, the panel and the AB’s position 
played out in favour of RE. However, some countries are at—
or will soon reach—the point where solar energy is cheaper 
than fossil fuel, as illustrated by certain areas in Australia. 
With a number of other disputes involving RE subsidies 
pending, there will likely be further opportunities for the 
panel and the AB to develop their positions on this issue. 
Agreement Renewable Energy Conventional Energy
Antidumping DS480, DS473 (biodiesel)
(DS306 (lead acid batteries))
DS460, DS454 (steel tubes)
DS216 (electrical transformers)
SCM Domestic 
content
DS459 (EU biodiesel)
DS456 (India Solar Mission)
DS452 (EU FIT)
DS426, DS412 (Canada FIT)
DS419 (wind power)
DS476	(EU	Third	Energy	Package)?
Actionable
CVD
DS459 (EU biodiesel)
DS456 (India Solar Mission)
DS437 (US CVD on solar & wind products)
DS437 (US CVD on steel & oil country tubular 
goods)
Trade Remedies Disputes Relating to Energy and Energy Input Products
TABLE 2:
ASCM rules capture a wide array of consumption and 
production fossil fuel subsidies to the extent that they 
are speciﬁc. In certain cases, however, it may be hard to 
prove adverse effects or speciﬁcity, and this is often the 
case when production fossil fuel subsidies are granted to 
the most polluting sources of energy (for example, coal 
mining). Moreover, ASCM rules do not adequately address 
governmental market transfer policies such as dual pricing 
practices. Similarly, a large portion of clean energy support 
measures fall within the scope of the ASCM, particularly 
those with local content requirements.
WAYS FORWARD
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REGULATORY CHALLENGES
Even if fossil fuel subsidies were banned, control on 
production (as practiced by the Organization of the 
Petroleum Exporting Countries [OPEC]) may still distort the 
market enough that RE will need to be subsidized to operate 
on a level playing ﬁeld. The current relaxation in production 
control, resulting in low oil prices, will likely redistribute 
production patterns among producers and make it difﬁcult 
to predict whether production controls will return after the 
weaker producers have been eliminated by low prices. The 
challenge here is whether energy market distortions can be 
tackled effectively by a redesign of subsidies disciplines when 
other regulatory or commercial trends may act at cross-
purposes with such a redesign.
If social and economic redistributive beneﬁts of cheap energy 
are deemed to be legitimate governmental objectives, it 
may be hard to retreat from the subsidies one-upmanship 
between conventional and RE subsidies, or to design 
exceptions that are both climate-friendly and serve short-
term redistributive and economic growth purposes. How 
should the social redistribution effect and safety net role 
played by energy subsidies be balanced with environmental 
objectives (which themselves also have a social component) 
and	economic	growth	and	development	objectives?
Existing subsidies may have inadvertent distorting effects, 
particularly by favouring some forms of RE with suboptimal 
environmental beneﬁts (for instance in the case of certain 
biofuels) over some with a lesser climate footprint (such 
as solar). Assuming the measure has an impact on trade, 
should such environmental distortions be taken into account 
in determining the existence and amount of the subsidy or 
trade	remedy?	For	instance,	could	an	“environmental	malus”	
be added to the amount of the countervailable subsidy to 
reflect	the	environmental	cost	of	the	subsidy?	
Equally, subsidies may distort trade between energy products 
and non-energy products, as illustrated in the case of biofuel 
feedstock and food crop (Babcock 2011). How can exceptions 
or	calculation	methodologies	discourage	such	distortions?
MAPPING OPTIONS FOR THE FUTURE
Several authors have proposed avenues to rethink existing 
disciplines in light of today’s economic, political, and 
environmental challenges.18 The calls for reform have 
intensiﬁed after the Canada – Renewable Energy case (Rubini 
2014; Cosbey and Rubini 2013). Many commentators 
have, in particular, warned against the dangers inherent in 
the “legal acrobatics” performed by the AB (Cosbey and 
Mavroidis 2014: 12). The common ground is that the judicial 
approach is sub-optimal compared to a more comprehensive 
approach based on either an amendment or an interpretative 
understanding (possibly complemented by a waiver) of 
existing ASCM rules. Most proposals have focussed on 
introducing adequate ﬂexibilities for clean energy subsidies, 
but some proposals have also aimed to address the main 
shortcomings of the ASCM in disciplining the use of fossil fuel 
subsidies. 
Limitations of political feasibility and the practicalities 
of increased regionalism in trade regulation offer a much 
broader range of possibilities than merely a revision of the 
ASCM. At least three types of considerations should inform 
the way forward.
•	 The	 “what”—should	 a	 reconsideration	 of	 subsidies	 and	
climate change be inscribed in a sectorial approach or fall 
within	the	scope	of	an	across-the-board	reframing?
•	 The	 “where”—should	 the	 issues	 be	 considered	 and	
regulated at the multilateral, regional, or unilateral level, 
or	a	combination	thereof?
•	 The	 “how”—should	 we	 aim	 for	 a	 legally	 binding	
framework, possibly backed by domestic or international 
adjudication, and how can “soft law” approaches be 
leveraged	in	addition,	or	in	the	gaps?
SECTORIAL APPROACH OR GENERAL 
STANDARDS? 
Reshaping the ASCM
Should an across-the-board solution be preferred, the issue is 
how to include climate change-oriented policy instruments 
that affect subsidies or countervailing measures as part of 
the general disciplines of the ASCM. In addition to modifying 
general disciplines, many commentators advocate re-
introducing exceptions or allowing waivers for environmental 
policies.
With respect to general ASCM disciplines reframed to 
address the speciﬁc issue of energy subsidies, the issue 
of dual pricing has been inserted in the Doha Round rules 
negotiations and some WTO Members have advocated 
the inclusion of dual pricing schemes as a new category 
of prohibited subsidies under Article 3 of the ASCM. The 
objective is to circumvent the speciﬁcity requirement 
of Article 2.19 These proposals have not gained general 
consensus among WTO Members. 
“Expanding the Prohibited ‘Red Light’ Subsidy Category, United States 
Proposal,” WTO/RL/GEN/94, 16 January 2006; Submission of the 
European Communities on Subsidies, European Union Proposal, WTO/
TN/RL/GEN/135, 24 April 2006.
“Expanding the Prohibited ‘Red Light’ Subsidy Category,” US Proposal, 
WTO/RL/GEN/94, 16 Jan 2006; “Submission of the European 
Communities on Subsidies, European Union Proposal,” WTO/TN/RL/
GEN/135, 24 April 2006.
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A difﬁculty with general rules on subsidies in the energy 
sector is their downstream effect on the entire economy, 
and spillover effects beyond that through exports. In an 
atomized global supply chain, the cross-border effects of 
subsidies are far-reaching and difﬁcult to measure, as is 
their impact on competing industry. The ASCM rules on 
geographical speciﬁcity, however, fail to address this reality 
so that only subsidies provided within national borders can 
fall under ASCM disciplines (Clarke 2015: 7–8). Moreover, 
ASCM rules are not drafted in a way as to capture upstream 
subsidization, which is also typical in a world of globalized 
supply chains (Clarke 2015: 8).
While generally acknowledging the merits of Article 
8.2 of the ASCM, many authors suggest that merely re-
introducing similarly drafted exceptions may not be 
sufﬁcient (see Howse 2010b: 20–21; Cosbey and Mavroidis 
2014: 37–43). Accordingly, they propose the introduction 
of new speciﬁc exceptions, either modelled on the language 
of Article XX (Rubini 2012), or partially incorporating 
its relevant objectives in a rationale-based set of newly 
drafted exceptions, offering a justiﬁcation to subsidies that 
pursue global public goods (Cosbey and Mavroidis 2014: 
45–47). Others propose that non-actionable subsidies 
include appropriate policies listed in the Kyoto Protocol to 
implement Kyoto commitments (Howse 2010b: 21). 
Another solution could be to introduce a waiver for existing 
and temporary renewable energy subsidies as per Article 
XI (3) of the Marrakech Agreement (Howse 2010b: 53–54; 
Porges and Brewer 2013: 59–60). Howse has, in particular, 
proposed that a clean energy waiver be conditioned on the 
removal of any discriminatory elements of a subsidy (for 
example, local content requirements) and of any other 
policies that may be in contradiction with the purpose the 
waiver aims to fulﬁl (such as climate change mitigation 
or environmental costs internalization), as well as contain 
an introductory clause similar in language to Article XX’s 
chapeau (Howse 2013: 53). During the waiver’s validity, any 
policy subject to it could be exempted from trade remedy 
action (Howse 2013: 54). It is not clear, however, whether 
clean energy subsidies should be exempted from ASCM 
Article 3. One difﬁculty is to deﬁne “clean energy”—whether 
RE or conventional fuel is environmentally preferable 
depends on speciﬁc circumstances.
Sectorial approaches 
A new Sustainable Energy Trade Agreement (SETA) has 
been proposed in International Centre for Trade and 
Sustainable Development (ICTSD) Working Papers. Kennedy 
has, in particular, suggested that a SETA could contain 
speciﬁc disciplines clarifying, adding, or diminishing ASCM 
obligations (Kennedy 2012). A SETA could build on the 
deﬁnition of “subsidy” in ASCM Article 1 to clarify which 
energy subsidies fall within the scope of subsidies disciplines. 
Alternatively, a SETA could provide a detailed classiﬁcation 
of generation, production, and supply of clean energy 
equipment and services subject to its subsidies disciplines. 
It could also expand the categories of prohibited subsidies 
beyond those addressed under ASCM Article 3 (Kennedy 
2012). Finally, a SETA could diminish ASCM disciplines by 
granting immunity to certain categories of clean energy 
subsidies. In this respect, the solutions already envisaged in 
the context of an ASCM reform are all applicable in principle. 
Yet, depending on the solution chosen (for example, the 
introduction of a speciﬁc category of non-actionable 
subsidies, or Article XX type of exceptions) and on the legal 
status of a SETA (for example, an Information Technology 
Agreement [ITA] type of agreement, an optional agreement 
added to Annex 4 of the WTO Agreement), the effectiveness 
of these clauses may vary (Kennedy 2012: 27–28). 
These options could also be adopted within the framework 
of the “Green Goods Initiative” launched in July 2014.20 
Although such negotiations are now focusing on tariff 
elimination on a broad list of climate-friendly goods, 
they will eventually touch upon non-tariff barriers and 
environmental services in accordance to the original Doha 
mandate (European Commission 2014).21
Multilateral, regional or unilateral regulation?
A number of proposals outlined above take a multilateral 
approach to dealing with the issue of energy subsidies 
and climate change. Whether it be at the WTO, under the 
auspices of the United Nations Framework Convention on 
Climate Change (UNFCCC), or in the context of a broad 
trade in energy treaty, the ambition is to devise rules that 
could apply to all states. The advantage of such an approach 
is to provide uniﬁed rules and a single forum for monitoring 
implementation, discussing amendments, and possibly 
providing adjudication. 
The political climate, however, makes the prospect of a 
multilateral agreement, regardless of forum, a very remote 
possibility. The mire of the Doha Round, the paralyzed post-
Kyoto framework, and the increasingly disaffected Energy 
Charter Treaty process are currently unlikely to yield the 
swift action that climate change adaptation and mitigation 
requires.
At the regional level, the effectiveness of any advancement 
in subsidies disciplines may be diluted by free-riding 
problems. Depending on the contracting parties, the impact 
of a regional solution may be limited. In this respect, mega-
regionals may prove critical in promoting new approaches 
On the sidelines of the World Economic Forum in Davos on 24 Jan 
2014, a group of 13 WTO members (the US, China, Australia, Canada, 
Costa Rica, Hong Kong, Japan, Korea, New Zealand, Norway, Singapore, 
Switzerland, and Chinese Taipei) led by the EU announced the intention 
to negotiate a plurilateral deal on the liberalization of trade in green 
goods. On 9 July 2014, they formally opened such negotiations in the 
WTO (Bridges Weekly 2014). 
Paragraph 31 (iii) of the 2001 Doha Declaration called for “the reduction 
or, as appropriate, elimination of tariff and non-tariff barriers to 
environmental goods and services.”
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to energy and energy subsidies. The Transatlantic Trade and 
Investment Partnership (TTIP) negotiations, in particular, 
have devoted signiﬁcant space to energy issues. A non-paper 
on the TTIP Chapter on “Energy and Raw Materials,” leaked 
and published by the Hufﬁngton Post on 19 May 2014, 
includes a number of draft provisions relevant to energy 
subsidies, particularly on the elimination of dual pricing 
practices and export restrictions (Articles C and E). The EU 
has also declared that the promotion of renewable energy 
will have a central role in the TTIP negotiations on energy 
(European Commission 2013: 3).
Notably, a number of G20 countries have pledged to 
unilaterally phase out market fossil fuel subsidies (ICTSD 
2012: 12–13). Such a move, as well as the economic data 
being generated by the IEA, OECD, and World Bank on 
energy subsidies will contribute to the reduction of market-
distorting fossil fuel subsidies regardless of reforms under the 
ASCM or in other fora. 
Hard law or soft law?
The political difﬁculties inherent in either amending the 
ASCM or devising new rules in other multilateral treaties 
have been noted above. They constitute a major impediment 
to a hard law approach to reform. Regional trade agreements 
or sectorial agreements may be more conducive to crafting 
binding legal standards on energy subsidies.
Some authors propose to adjust ASCM rules by means 
of an interpretative understanding, either promulgated 
at the committee level at the WTO or initiated as an open 
plurilateral agreement (Howse 2013: 51–53; Porges and 
Brewer 2013: 60–61). This solution could, on the one hand, 
permit to clarify once and for all the applicability of GATT 
Article XX to ASCM disciplines (Howse 2013: 51), which 
still remains uncertain although it is advocated by some 
scholars (Rubini 2012: 570). On the other hand, it could focus 
on deﬁning the contours of key concepts such as beneﬁt, 
ﬁnancial contribution, and speciﬁcity in a way that leaves 
WTO Members sufﬁcient green policy space (Howse 2013: 
52). While providing for a more ﬂexible solution compared 
to the amendment scenario, the value and impact of an 
interpretative understanding on the ASCM along these lines 
would depend on the breadth of the solutions adopted and, 
at least in the case where it is initiated as an open plurilateral 
agreement, on whether major players join it or not. 
Soft law instruments in the area of subsidies may be 
instrumental in generating more information about energy 
subsidies and establishing a shared understanding of 
what is entailed by WTO commitments so as to ensure 
their credibility (Shaffer et al. 2015: 25). Although existing 
soft law mechanisms at the WTO (including notiﬁcation 
requirements, monitoring mechanisms, and Trade Policy 
Reviews) have not per se proved effective in inducing 
governments to phase out subsidies (Shaffer et al. 2015: 
3-10), the development of complementary soft law 
initiatives on energy subsidies by other international 
institutions, in particular UN agencies, IEA, OECD, and 
relevant NGOs, ideally of the kind instigated by the Food and 
Agriculture Organization (FAO) and other NGOs in the area 
of ﬁsheries subsidies, may be conducive to creating political 
pressure on states to make progress on energy subsidies 
reform (Shaffer et al. 2015: 25).
How climate costs internalization and other environmental 
distortion reductions might be implemented will be affected 
by how international subsidy disciplines may be redeﬁned 
within or outside the WTO. Existing ASCM disciplines have 
the potential to accommodate some subsidies for a climate 
change perspective, but they may require some amendments 
to provide a more coherent framework. 
The ﬁrst-best option would be a new multilateral agreement 
on subsidies or trade remedies (with an appropriate carve-
out in the WTO regime to allow for it if such an agreement 
is concluded outside it). Alternatively, climate change-
related subsidies could be included as part of another 
multilateral regime. Most likely, the disciplines would be 
more effective if they were incorporated in the WTO, rather 
than in another multilateral regime such as climate change 
regulation instruments. A second-best solution, which may 
be within closer political reach, would be to implement such 
an approach at the regional level. At this level, however, free-
riding problems may occur and, depending on what actors 
are involved, the impact could be rather limited. A third-best 
solution would be to incorporate rules on energy subsidies in 
sectorial agreements. For example, this approach could be 
espoused in a SETA. 
In the meantime, a ﬁrst step towards building consensus on 
a more coordinated approach may be under way with the 
intensiﬁcation of unilateral efforts towards dismantling fossil 
fuel subsidies. 
CONCLUSION
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